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This essay examines Giambattista Vico’s philology as a contribution to democratic legit-
imacy. I outline three steps in Vico’s account of the historical and political development
of philological knowledge: ﬁrst, hismerger of philosophy and philology, and the effects of
that merger on the relative claims of reason and authority; second, his use of antiquarian
knowledge to supersede historicist accounts of change in time and to position the plebian
social class as the true arbiters of language; third, his understanding of philological
knowledge as an instrument of political change, and a foundational element in the estab-
lishment of democracy. In its treatment of the philological imagination as a tool for
bringing about political change, Vico’s plebian philology is radically democratic and a
crucial instrument in the struggle against the elite from antiquity to the present.iambattista Vico experienced a conversion midway through his intellectual
journey. Longing for a more philological philosophy, the Italian thinker and
rhetorician became persuaded that a turn to the vernacular was the surest way
of achieving this aim. Both the philologists and the philosophers, he discovered, were
in error, having forgotten each other’s truths. Inquiring into the origins of the dissen-
sion between philosophy and philology, Vico alighted on two codicils:
1. Vulgar letters, originating with mathematics, led human beings to the
metaphysics of philosophy.
2. As the heroic language ﬁrst separated the heroes from ordinary humans,
so later vulgar language divided philosophers from philologists.1project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation
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248 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FAL L 20 1 8From these two historical processes, the birth of writing and the separation of the ver-
nacular from the literary language, Vico arrived at the penultimate moment in his ge-
nealogy of human knowledge. A division ensued between philosophers, who investi-
gate the nature of things, and philologists, who study the origins of words. This
division was to determine, even overdetermine, the subsequent course of thought as
well as politics well into the present. And so, concluded Vico, “philosophy and philol-
ogy, born together like twins from the heroic language, were severed by the vernacular
[lingua vulgari]” (DCP, 107).2
The severance inaugurated by the introduction of the vernacular led to a division
between philosophy and philology that contributed to the ﬂourishing of ancient Greek
civilization. Vico contrasts philosophy, the discipline concerned with natural law, with
philology, the discipline concerned with contingency and convention, including the
convention of language. Philology is concerned with the sources of authority, and ac-
cess to it confers power. Concerned with the preconditions for political speech, it is
linked genealogically to vernacular knowledge. Traversing Vico’s disciplinary identity,
his polemics with Augustine, and his reading of Roman law, this essay examines how
the Italian thinker’s discovery of vernacular philology motivates the democratic (and
demotic) orientation of his political thought.
From De antiquissima, the ﬁrst noncommissioned philosophical treatise he ever
wrote, to the ﬁnal edition of the New Science, published six months after his death,
Vico staked out for himself a philosophical terrain navigable only through the philo-
logical method. Judging based on inﬂuence, Vico’s philosophy was more successful
than his philology, but a full grasp of his work requires that the two knowledge forms
be examined in their mutually constitutive relations. Rather than disencumbering
Vico’s philosophy from its “philological wrapping” and judging it on purely philo-
sophical grounds, as some have advocated, I aim to think these two distinct, yet inti-
mately related, forms of knowledge together.32. Works by Vico are cited parenthetically in the text by the following abbreviations: De constantia
philologia (Naples: Giuseppi Jovene, 1841), cited as DCP; Principe di scienza nuova, 3rd ed., in Opere, a
cura di Fausto Nicolini (Milan: Ricciardi, 1953), cited as SN; The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico,
trans. M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1944), cited as AGV;De anti-
quissima italorum sapientia, ed. Manuela Sanna (Rome: Edizione di Storia e Letteratura, 2005), cited as
DA; and On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, trans. L. Palmer (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1988), cited as MAWI.
3. The words are those of James Morrison, “Vico’s Principle of Verum Is Factum and the Problem
of Historicism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 39, no. 4 (1978): 581.
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Any account of Vico’s plebian philology must ﬁrst wrestle with the ubiquitous conﬂa-
tion of Vichian philology with history.4 Erich Auerbach, himself the translator of the
ﬁrst half of Vico’sNew Science into German in 1924 and one of the twentieth century’s
greatest philologists, sanctioned this conﬂation when he noted that “each historian”
can be called “withVico’s terminology, [a] ‘philologist.’ ”5 But is “history,” even in Auer-
bach’s sense, analogous to Vichian ﬁlologia? Auerbach’s characterization of Vico’s meth-
odology as one that included “not only political history in its speciﬁc sense, but also
the history of expression, of language, of script, of the arts, of religion, of law” (32) sug-
gests that Vico’s proclivities lay in forms of historical inquiry that long predate moder-
nity.
Auerbach elsewhere emphasized that Vico’s term of choice for his vocation was
philology rather than history, but he did not distinguish between these forms of knowl-
edge. Auerbach could access no direct corollary for antiquarian knowledge (other than
philology), and history by the twentieth century had subsumed within itself the anti-
quarian methodology. Constrained to read according to these horizons, Auerbach
grafted onto Vichian philology a method that was disturbed by his belief in the verid-
icality of myth. How many historians today would claim with Vico to have produced a
“philosophical criticism” capable of tracing “a natural theogony, meaning the geneal-
ogy of the gods as it was naturally created by the founders of the pagan world” (SN
§§392, 7, 69)? A modern historian would be deterred from any aspiration to prove that
humans descended from giants, and that the myths concerning Jupiter, Mars, and Mi-
nerva were factually true. By advancing such claims, Vico’s sacral hermeneutics dis-
rupts the historicist forms of reasoning based on causality, even as his philosophy4. The ﬁrst English translator of the New Science tells us in his classic account of Vico’s interpre-
tation of Roman law that Vico understands “philology” in the sense of “history” (Max H. Fisch, “Vico
on Roman Law,” in Essays in Political Theory: Presented to George H. Sabine, ed. Milton R. Konvitz and
Arthur E. Murphy [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948], 65); this is not the case even with ref-
erence to the speciﬁc passage Fisch relies on. Likewise, Leon Pompa passes judgment on the presumed
equivalence between “philology” and “history”: “[in Vico] ‘philologian’ is given the meaning which the
term ‘historian’ now possesses” (“Vico’s Science,”History & Theory 10, no. 1 [1971]: 51). In their trans-
lation of Vico’s Autobiography, Fisch and Bergin make the following editorial interpolation: “philology
[5 historiography]” (AGV, 157; brackets in the original).
5. Erich Auerbach, “Vico’s Contribution to Literary Criticism,” in Studia philologica et litteraria in
honorem L. Spitzer, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Bern: Francke, 1958), 35. Notwithstanding Auer-
bach’s stature as a major literary critic, his reading of Vico misses the political salience of Vico’s inter-
weaving of philosophy and philology as well as the democratic implications of his decision to ground
human knowledge in plebian philology.
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Vico’s antiquarian philology remains relatively undeciphered to this day, while its po-
litical implications unexplored. With notable exceptions, scholars who read Vico as
Marxist avant la lettre tend to ignore his philology, while scholars interested in his phi-
lology tend to focus on it in relative isolation from his political theory.7 The pages that
follow tease out the political vision underpinning this philology.
MAKING TRUTH
One of Vico’s most important contributions is his verum-factum principle, which he
ﬁrst began to elaborate in his De antiquissima (1710). Distinguishing between the true
(verum) and the made ( factum), Vico argues that the true and the made are inter-
changeable (verum esse ipsum factum). From the premise that truth is knowable only
insofar as it is made, it follows that we create what we know. In the New Science, the
distinction between the true and the made illuminates historical and disciplinary
knowledge. Verum-certum is for Vico the principle according to which we distinguish
between what is knowable without mediation and what must be taken as given with-
out being subjected to rational inquiry. While the epistemological implications of the
verum-certum distinction are not yet fully developed in De antiquissima, its philolog-
ical fundament is amply in evidence in the earlier text.
De antiquissima’s primary aim was to examine the philosophical understanding of
the ancient Italians through a philological inventory of the Latin language. Vico imme-
diately realized that he would have to have recourse to literary texts, in particular to the
plays of Terence and Plautus, in his efforts to reconstruct the language of ancient Ital-
ian wisdom. So, while framing his book as a philosophical invective against Descartes,
Leibniz, and Malebranche, most of the evidence Vico adduces is literary. The ﬁrst of
Vico’s literary arguments is presented in the opening, in the chapter titled “Verum and
Factum.” “For the [ancient] Latins,” states Vico, “verum and factum are interchange-
able.” Vico further adds that intelligere ‘to read perfectly’ or ‘to have plain knowledge’6. For two classic studies of Vico’s philosophy of history, see Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of
Giambattista Vico, trans. R. G. Collingwood (New York: Macmillan, 1913); and Isaiah Berlin, Vico and
Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas (London: Hogarth, 1976). Notwithstanding their merits,
like Auerbach’s reconstruction of Vico, neither of these texts is attuned to Vico’s philological method.
7. This emergent and exciting area of scholarship includes Pierre Girard, Giambattista Vico—
Rationalité et politique: Une lecture de la Scienza nuova (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne,
2008); David L. Marshall, Vico and the Transformation of Rhetoric in Early Modern Europe (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Barbara Naddeo, Vico and Naples: The Urban Origins
of Modern Social Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Older approaches to Vico as a
proto-Marxist are collected in Giorgio Tagliacozzo, ed., Vico and Marx: Afﬁnities and Contrasts (At-
lantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1983).
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V I CO ’ S P L E B I AN PH I LO LOGY | 25 1is identical in ancient Latin to cogitare ‘to think’ (pensare) and ‘to gather’ (andar
raccogliendo) (DA, 14).
Vico proceeds to elaborate the implications of these etymologies: words signify ideas
in material form; legere ‘to read’ applies to one who “combines the written elements of
which words are composed”; intelligere ‘to understand’ applies to one who combines
parts into a conceptual whole. This etymological excursus ends with an attribution of
philosophical insight to the “ancient sages of Italy,” who left no writing behind and
whose thought system Vico has undertaken to reconstruct through language: “It is rea-
sonable that the ancient sages of Italy entertained the following belief about truth: The
true is precisely what is made [verum esse ipsum factum].” Again, vernacularity is con-
nected, through the preliterate Italians’ barbaric language, to the birth of philology.
Early reviewers of De antiquissima protested that Vico’s argument was based on
scanty evidence. One reviewer complained in 1711 that Vico had based his entire the-
ory on a few inconsequential lines from the comedies of Terence in support of his case
(MAWI, 145). Arnaldo Momigliano, one of Vico’s most attentive critics, observed that
“De antiquissima was a ﬁction in the sense that Vico attributed to the ancient Italians a
theory of knowledge which was his own.”8 Scholars of Italian linguistics have disputed
the technical details of Vico’s hypothesis.9 Interpreted as a historical proposition, the
claim that the ancient Italians equated verum and factum remains unpersuasive.
Vico’s genealogy accounted for the severance of two intimately related knowledge
forms—reason and imagination—and their attendant disciplines, philosophy and phi-
lology. Having discovered a proposition he wished to elaborate, Vico culled a few Latin
texts and constructed on that basis a new epistemology. He achieved this not by recon-
structing a premodern archive, but through his imagination, his capacity for fantasia,
and his gift for wonder (maraviglia). In advancing an unveriﬁable proposition, Vico
was unfazed by its philological implausibility.10 Vico’s attenuated relationship to his-
torical reconstruction distinguished him from his contemporaries and helped him
bridge philology and philosophy.8. Arnaldo Momigliano, Terzo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome:
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966), 162.
9. Robert A. Hall Jr., “G. B. Vico and Linguistic Theory,” Italica 18, no. 3 (1941): 145–54.
10. See Vico’s response to the ﬁrst criticism of Antiquissima (MAWI, 119). Challenged to demon-
strate that factum and verum were equivalent in ancient Latin, Vico cites just two instances from two
plays of Terence. In the ﬁrst, a character admits to an action by saying “factum” (Eunuchus, 4.707–8);
in the second play (Heautotimorumenos [Self-tormentor], 3.567), a character acknowledges that an ac-
tion had transpired through the very same word ( factum). Vico takes this as philological proof that
verum and factum were indistinguishable in early Latin, but not many philologists would be satisﬁed
by such an argument.
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ancient Italians, my interest here lies with how Vico’s philology generated a theory of
knowledge and of political agency on newly plebian—and newly democratic—founda-
tions. Vico’s errors bear the traces of his method of interpretation. Vico’s political phi-
lology inculcates a unique understanding of the imagination as an agent in generating
political change, as well as democratic legitimacy. While historians working in the tra-
dition of Scaliger and Momigliano seek historical accuracy, a political philologist work-
ing in the spirit of Vico must recognize the limitations of historicism when confronted
with philological contingency.
THE CONSOLATIONS OF PHILOLOGY
Vico would been familiar with at least two precedents for the title of his second major
contribution to the epistemology of philological knowledge,De constantia jurispruden-
tis, in the masterpiece of another eminent philosophical philologist: Justus Lipsius. Lip-
sius’s treatise on Stoic ethics, De constantia, was published in 1584.11 However, Vico’s
De constantia jurisprudentis—especially its second book on the constancy of philol-
ogy—could not have differed more drastically from the treatise of the earlier French hu-
manist. Lipsius engaged with Stoic philosophy so as to enable the attainment of tranquil-
ity. Vico engaged with ancient Italian philology to contest Cartesian rationalism. Lipsius
cited as his motto Seneca’s insistence on passive obedience: “Do not perturb what is not
in your power to change. We are born in need of guidance: OBEY GOD, FOR THAT IS LIB-
ERTY.”12 Vico’s plebian philology reserved its highest praise for those who withhold
their consent to society’s laws.
By contrast with Lipsius, all of Vico’s work after De antiquissima was oriented to-
ward the articulation and elaboration of a new political theology. This orientation led
Vico to claim that his “new metaphysics discovers the origins of divine and human
institutions in the pagan nations” (SN §31). Indeed, in Vichian cosmology, the trans-
formation of the bestioni—a term roughly translatable as “feral creatures” but which11. Lipsius may have adopted this term for his treatise in order to invoke Boethius’sDe consolatione
philosophiae (ca. 525). Consiantiae translates the Stoic term eύpaveίai, roughly, those emotions worthy
of cultivation, used in contradistinction to the term pa̓vh, or pertubationes, which were to be shunned
(CD, 14.8; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 14.6). Vico only cites Lipsius twice in the New Science—once
to emend his transcription of a verb found in the Twelve Tables (§955) and then to report on Lipsius’s
comparison of the ancient Germans in Tacitus to the American Indians (§470). But he would certainly
have been aware of Lipsius’s treatment of Stoic philosophy.
12. “Nec porturbari, his quoe vitari nostroa potestatis non est. In regno nati sumus: DEO PARARE,
LIBERTAS EST” (Justus Lipsius, Traité de la Constance, ed. Lucien du Bos [Brussels: Murquart, 1874],
217). I have beneﬁted from this bilingual French-Latin edition of Lipsius’s treatise and from de Bos’s
comprehensive introduction (7–106).
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ulates the process through which religion was formed.13 The best-known result of this
political theology is the third edition of the New Science (1744), but many important
contributions by Vico precede his magnum opus. Perhaps Vico had Lipsius in mind
when he argued against Stoicism in the ﬁrst part of De constantia jurisprudentis, titled
“De constantia philosophiae.” Four sections are devoted to a discussion and refutation
of Stoic premises.14 But by the time that he reached the penultimate section of De
constantia jurisprudentis, “On the constancy of philology,” Vico had left Lipsius be-
hind.
Vico sought in this treatise to programmatically deﬁne philology for the ﬁrst time.
Here is his deﬁnition: “Philology is the study of discourse [sermonis studium]. It con-
cerns itself with all matters connected to words [verba]. It recounts their history and
narrates their origin and progress. It classiﬁes them according to its various ages, so as
to grasp their proper and ﬁgurative meanings [translationes] and their usage [usus].
But, since the ideas of things are inscribed in words, philology must ﬁrst look to the
history of things [rerum Historiam]” (DCP, 29).15 Vico distinguishes between history
and philology: philology engages history to determine words’ meaning and usages, but
it regards history as external to itself. “The history of things” is later equated with phi-
losophy. Even while assuming the distinctiveness of verba and res, Vico’s philology
encompasses both. Although Vichian philology is not wholly history in the modern
sense, it is historical in that it is concerned with the things (res) of this world. Vico’s
preoccupation by the things of the world makes philology more philosophically con-
sequential and more politically salient than a mere collation of words.16
Alongside his merger of philosophy and philology and his infusion of historical in-
quiry with the imagination, knowledge in Vico’s account advances the good of the13. In addition to the studies cited passim, for scholarship speciﬁcally on Vico’s resigniﬁcation of
bestioni, see Nicola Perullo, Bestie e bestioni: Il problema dell’animale in Vico (Naples: Guida, 2002);
and Stefano Velotti, Sapienti e bestioni: Saggio sull’ignoranza, il sapere e la poesia in Giambattista Vico
(Parma: Pratiche, 1995).
14. “Ut probanda Dogmata Metaphysica Stoicorum?,” “De Fato dogma qua acceptione falsum”
(both chap. 6); “Impia Stoicorum superbia” (chap. 10); and “Quae Stoicorum moralia dogmata Chris-
tianis consentanae” (chap. 13).
15. The nearly contemporary Programma de philologia subsidio studii theologici vehenmenter utili
ac necesario (Braunschweig: Litteris Keitelianis, 1746), 3, also deﬁnes philology by conjoining the study
of discourse to history: “Philologiae nomen, quod . . . sermonis stadium signiﬁcant . . . apud illios
philologi dicerentur historiarum ac variae eruditionis studiosi” (Philology is a noun signifying the
study of discourse . . . those who study history and various erudite discourses are called philologists).
16. For a perceptive reading of Vico’s res/verba distinction, see Michael Mooney, “The Primacy of
Language in Vico,” Social Research 43, no. 3 (1976): 588–89.
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254 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FAL L 20 1 8commonwealth. Philology’s aims, Vico argues, are unambiguously political and neces-
sary for the republic’s welfare (DCP, 28). For Vico philology is both the founding sci-
ence of the humanities and the epistemic foundation of polities. “Philologists follow
their calling,” he writes, “when they write commentaries on commonwealths, the cus-
toms, laws, institutions, branches of learning, and artifacts of nations and peoples.”
Philologists give evidence concerning ancient times they explicate the rhetoric of or-
ators, philosophers, even historians, and especially poets. When they practice this vo-
cation, “the commonwealth receives great beneﬁt [maximam capit utilitatem]: it can
interpret the ancient language of its laws and religion” (29). These reﬂections intimate
correspondences Vico later elaborated in the New Science, namely, that philology is to
authority what philosophy is to reason.17 Vico’s pronounced republican tendencies
and his conviction that the only worthwhile knowledge serves the good of the com-
monwealth and helps people to bridge their “monstrous isolation” (SN §1106) set
him apart here and elsewhere from his contemporaries.
VICO, AUGUST INE , VARRO
For all its seeming invisibility, Augustine’s De civitate dei may well be the most ubiq-
uitously present among the many works that inﬂuenced the New Science. Much of
Vico’s material, particularly his reliance on Varro’s Antiquities of Things Divine and
Human (Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum), which is extant only in frag-
ments, derives from this source. At the same time, Augustine, who preserved much of
Varro’s most important work, functions as a negative and silent weight against whom
Vico grounds his argument. Vico does not openly position himself in opposition to
Augustine; a passionately pious Christian and deep believer in divine providence, Vico
may have been oblivious to his conceptual distance from late antiquity’s most inﬂuen-
tial exegete. But no reader of The City of God can engage the New Science without per-
ceiving the reversal Vico effected with respect to Augustine’s conceptual framework.
Long before Vico, philosophers had challenged Augustine’s epistemology, but they
rarely if ever did so from within a religious framework. Instead of offering a new god
to replace Augustinian hermeneutics, Vico located his writings squarely within Christian
revelation, while evoking a pre-Augustinian natural entelechy derived from Varronian
antiquarianism.17. “Philosophia fermat constatium rationis; tentemus, ut Philologia fermet constantiam aucto-
ritatis, qua via, diximus, auctoritatem partem esse rationis” (Philosophy is guided by the principle of
reason; philology is guided by the principle of authority. From this, we conclude that authority is part
of reason) (DCP, 28).
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Augustine is his reintroduction of Varro to the philological horizon. More even than
for philologists such as Scaliger, who preceded him, Varro’s lost Antiquitates meant
more to Vico than a source of information concerning ancient Rome. As the Varro
of the eighteenth century and an antiquarian within an anti-antiquarian modernity,
Vico called his Latin predecessor “the most learned of the ancients [antiquitatis
doctissimus]” (DCP, 199; SN §52). For Vico, anyone who had contributed to making
the past alive in the present was ipso facto an antiquarian. An ancient discipline served
as the epistemic foundations for Vico’s modern philological imagination.
Vico stakes out an epistemic terrain for plebian philology when he argues that the
myths generated by the savages (bestioni) were grounded in empirical reality.18 The
very same myths that Vico incorporated into his philology had invited Augustine’s op-
probrium when he was confronted with Varro’s endorsement of myths as necessary
for the good of the commonwealth. Vico argued that stories concerning the acts of pa-
gan gods reﬂected actual events and were not just the illusory mental projections of
uncomprehending heathens. In Vico, superstition is given a second life within a Var-
ronian civil theology that, though mediated by Augustine, sharply contrasts with the
latter’s taxonomy. Given his profound attachment to the Catholic faith, Vico was not
eager to emphasize the contrasts between his ontology of the fabulous and that of Au-
gustine, Christianity’s most important post-Pauline exegete. However, it cannot be de-
nied that a close reading of De civitate dei in relation to theNew Science and in relation
to the partial scholarly reconstruction of Varro’s Antiquitates yields two radically ir-
reconcilable points of view.
Brieﬂy reconstructing Augustine’s rejection of Varronian hermeneutics will clarify
how Vico reversed the antiquarian-historian relation by offering the profoundly new,
and no less profoundly ancient, genealogy of the gods that is the New Science. Augus-
tine understood myth (muvοj, which he translated as fabula) to be inconsistent with
the Christian revelation that postulated absolute and certain knowledge. As Momi-
gliano perspicaciously observed, Roman and Christian metaphysics were divided ac-
cording to the following principle: the ﬁrst favored authority as the arbiter of values;
the second favored revelation.19 Just as Roman antiquarians such as Varro and Cicero
took little interest in revelations that could not be grounded in authority (and which18. An extended analysis of this argument is offered in Joseph Mali, “The Revision of Mythology,”
in The Rehabilitation of Myth: Vico’s “New Science” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
136–209.
19. For an excellent discussion of Cicero’s relation to religious belief, see Arnaldo Momigliano,
“The Theological Efforts of the Roman Upper Classes in the First Century B.C.,” Classical Philology 79,
no. 3 (1984): 199–211, esp. n. 9.
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256 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FA L L 2 0 1 8therefore, as Vico would have noted, could not serve the commonwealth), so early Chris-
tians were drawn to a religion that seemed to offer an alternative to authority in the form
of revelation.
Varro and Cicero did not need to believe in the gods in order to recognize their
political efﬁcacy.20 From the vantage point of the commonwealth, what mattered
was the contribution of the idea of the gods to the good of the republic. Varro and Cic-
ero were happy to leave demonstrations and refutations of the existence of the gods to
the philosophers. This is why Varro made the (for Augustine) scandalous suggestion
that “it is expedient in a commonwealth for brave men to believe, though it be a ﬁction,
that they are descended from the gods.”21 For Augustine, the political good was sub-
ordinate to religion’s doctrines. Before asking whether the gods served the good of
the commonwealth, it was necessary to consider whether their existence could be rec-
onciled with Christian revelation. If the existence of the gods proved incompatible
with the Christian revelation, then the fabulous genealogies through which Varro and
others had expounded on the good of the commonwealth were emptied of any concep-
tual value for Augustine. With respect to their rejection of the imagination as an ar-
biter of truth, and of popular belief in favor of autonomous reason, abstracted from
any social context, Augustine seemed to Vico to anticipate Descartes. This conceptual
alliance placed both thinkers in opposition to Vico’s own vision for a just and poeti-
cally ontologized world.
Augustine did not take into consideration in his critique of Cicero’s and Varro’s
political theology the distance between their concepts of truth and his own. A claim
regarding the falsity of the gods from a Christian perspective is epistemically distinct
from a claim regarding their falsity from the point of view of Roman law. When myths
have been accepted as real, as they had been by Varro, then imagination becomes a
distinctly political act. Sensing that Augustinian epistemology weakened the political
power of the imagination, Vico argued for a return to a pre-Augustinian metaphysics
that accepted, not that the gods were alive in the present, but that they had once
roamed the earth. The existence of the gods in Varro’s sense was conceptually prior
to the political theory that grounded Vico’s secular state. Vico’s recognition of radical
temporal difference has led scholars and theorists to regard Vico as a predecessor to20. According to Vico, Cicero “spoke as an expert in antiquities” (SN §777). Vico’s description of
Cicero supports Elizabeth Rawson’s argument (Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic [Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985]) that “Cicero stood closer to the tradition of antiquarianism
than to that of historiography proper” (33).
21. Augustine, City of God, trans. G. E. McCracken (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1957),
1:277.
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V I CO ’ S P L E B I AN PH I LO LOGY | 257historicism.22 Meanwhile, Vico’s unique grasp of the role of the imagination in bring-
ing about political change has gone underappreciated.
Vico reversed Augustinian ontology through his political genealogy of poetic knowl-
edge. He maintained that Homer received the ancient myths “in a corrupt and indeco-
rous form” (SN §808). “All these myths,”Vico asserted, “were initially true stories which,
gradually altered and corrupted, reached the age of Homer.” Characteristically, Vico’s
proof was language itself, viewed along a continuumof temporal difference. “The ﬁrst he-
roic age invented myths as true narratives,” he wrote, “which is the primary and proper
meaning of the Greek word mythos. The second age altered and corrupted these myths;
and the third and ﬁnal age, Homer’s age, received them in this corrupt form” (§808).
Vico’s wording strongly recalls Augustine’s citations from Cicero in the ﬁnal books of
The City of God. Cicero too had suggested that during the age of Homer humans believed
in the gods. The transition from the age of heroes to the age of men entailed a process of
secularization. As Cicero noted concerning the era of Romulus (eighth century BCE), the
founder of Rome: “other men who are said to have become gods lived in less educated
ages, when there was a greater propensity for fabrication [ﬁngendi], andwhen the unedu-
cated [minus eruditis] were easily persuaded to believe anything.”23
Vico’s democratic commitment to plebian epistemology exceeded that of Cicero.
Whereas the Roman statesman had expressed surprise that anyone could deify the
founder of Rome, Vico did not despise the epistemologies Cicero deemed primitive
and vulgar. The loss of Varro’s Antiquitates makes any reconstruction of his views
necessarily speculative, and we can only guess what Varro believed himself to be doing
on the basis of the citations given by Augustine, his opponent.24 But we do know what
Vico read, and we know that his access to Varro, was, in terms of his sources, as limited
as our own. Fragmented and based on anti-Varronian polemics, this archive was trans-
mitted by scholars who were hostile to the very texts they transmitted. We know
enough to conclude that Vico the early modern philologist of plebian politics joined
forces with Varro, the greatest antiquarian of antiquity, to pioneer a political episte-
mology that neither Augustine nor Cicero could have foreseen.2522. See n. 6 above, as well as R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (1946; Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 63–71.
23. Augustine, City of God 7.194 (5 22.6).
24. For an important reconstruction, see Joseph McAlhany, “Language, Truth, and Illogic in the
Writings of Varro” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003).
25. A strong case has been made, on the basis of his writings on agriculture and household man-
agement, for the political conservativism of Varro’s thought. Werner Jaeger, among others, presents
Varro as a “reactionary” (The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers [Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood,
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in his New Science. Nowhere did Vico praise Augustine, although every use he made of
Varro points directly to Augustine’s mediation. Vico argued that myths have empirical
foundations. Those who believed in myths, and who, like the composite Homer, be-
lieved they were composing poetry under the tutelage of the gods, were not practicing
deceit. Myths, like poetry, were not merely true but also necessary, in the basic epis-
temological sense that they were conceptually prior to all other ways of knowing.
David Marshall accounts for this well when he writes that, for Vico, poetry “is the an-
tithesis of decorative choice. It is the faculty that permits human beings to build con-
cepts.”26 At the same time, Vico, always attuned to radical temporal difference, limited
the temporal scope of his claims. His insistence that myths possessed historical and
poetical veracity in the past did not bind him to insist on their empirical dimensions
in the present. Vico’s concept of historical change is temporally diverse though not
historicist. Instead of reviving the past for its own sake, Vico sought to discover and
render ancient humanity’s primordial sense of wonder (maraviglia), which encom-
passed nonliterate, and even prelinguistic, forms of knowledge. The New Science, notes
Giuseppe Mazzotta, “features wonder as the category under which the poetic and the
religious belong,” for it is “the state that ruptures the uniformity of an undifferentiated
world.”27 Vico made a case for an unfalsiﬁable epistemology that was not inconsequen-
tial by virtue of its unfalsiﬁability. Who is to say that the gods did not factually exist in
the past?, he asked. Vico perceived that facts are as much articles of faith as are the
constructs of the imagination.
Vico’s populist epistemology of the imagination brings us to the locus classicus of
Vichian political philology: his famous attempt to combine two forms of knowledge,
the philosophical and the philological, within a single system. We have witnessed
Vico’s initial incorporation of res and verba into a method of inquiry that incorporates
both reason and authority in De constantia philologia. In that earlier articulation, phi-
losophy remained peripheral to Vico’s philological endeavor. Only in the entirely re-
vised third edition of the New Science (1744) were philology and philosophy made26. Marshall, Vico and the Transformation of Rhetoric, 208. For the purposes of this discussion, I
have assumed the relative identity of poetic and philological knowledge; the difference between the the
terms, which are used interchangeably at times, is that poetry enables and generates philological
knowledge, which in turn makes poetry into its object of inquiry.
27. Giuseppe Mazzotta, The New Map of the World: The Poetic Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 109.
1980], 3; also see Howard Weinbrot,Menippean Satire Reconsidered: From Antiquity to the Eighteenth
Century [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005], 29–39). These presentations concentrate
on Varro’s personal sentiments rather than the broad themes of his writings. The political implications
of Varro’s civil theology have not been subjected to philosophical analysis.
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lence is an inﬂuential passage that deﬁnes philology in relation to philosophy before
lamenting the failure of both disciplines to engage each other:
Philosophy contemplates reason [ragioni], from which comes the science of
truth [la scienza del vero]. Philology submits to the authority of human will,
from which comes knowledge of what is certain [la conscienza del certo].
The second half of this axiom deﬁnes as philologists all grammarians, historians,
and critics occupied with peoples’ languages and deeds, their domestic customs
and laws, their foreign wars, peaces, pacts, and travels and commerce.
This axiom also demonstrates how the philosophers and the philologists have
failed each other. The philosophers have failed to use the philologists’ authority
to certify their reasoning, just as the philologists have failed to employ the rea-
soning of the philosophers to verify their authorities. Had they not made this
mistake, they would have done more good for our republics, and would have
anticipated my New Science. (SN §138–40).
It took Vico twenty years of intense mental labor to arrive at this articulation. Vico
does not specify which philosophers he had in mind when he criticized their failure to
heed philology’s authority, but we need not look far. The natural law theorists Grotius,
Selden, and Pufendorf continually come under attack in the New Science (e.g., §§310,
313, 318) for their elitist and antiphilological assumptions concerning the role of rea-
son in human history. Like his peers in the ﬁeld of natural law, Vico too aimed to
found a science based on rational inquiry. He differed from natural rights theorists
in that he did not see rational inquiry as the only or even the ideal mode through which
humans accessed truth. Further, Vico was acutely aware of the political implications of
privileging reason, a mode of thought cultivated by the ruling elite and beyond the
reach of those they ruled, as the superior knowledge form, and of accepting the con-
comitant downgrading of wonder that the rationalist hierarchy entailed. The epistemic
delegitimation of poetic knowledge entailed the political disenfranchisement of the
plebeians. Philology provided Vico with a democratic politics that philosophy, occu-
pying the endpoint of the authority-reason continuum, could not offer.
Vico states in his autobiography that the idea of combining philosophy with phi-
lology ﬁrst occurred to him while reading Grotius’s Laws of War and Peace (1625).28
He was fascinated by the Dutch jurist’s combination of legal reasoning with textual28. Opere di Giambattista Vico, ed. Francesco Saverio Pomodoro (Naples: Stamperia de Classici
Latini, 1858), 1:25 (5 AGV, 154).
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Scaliger, while the latter was resident in Leiden. Vico also learned much about reason
in relation to authority from Bacon, whose presence is particularly palpable in the ﬁrst
edition of his New Science, and fromHobbes, whose civil philosophy served as a model
against which Vico constructed his Varronian civil theology. And yet the precise for-
mulation that Vico gave to the bestioni’s philosophical-philological way of knowing, as
savages become heroes, heroes become human, and humans become the Roman plebs,
exceeds his predecessors.29
A century prior to Vico, Thomas Hobbes referred to the plebeians in derogatory
terms when he wrote in the Leviathan (1651) that the “Prayers and Thanksgiving”
due to God should be offered “in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor Ple-
beian.”30 Although an offhand statement, made without reference to Roman history,
this early extrapolation of the original meaning of the term onto a cotemporary post-
Westphalian context is revealing. By contrast with the dominant trend of post-Westphalian
political and legal theory, Vico chose to vest the authority for the integrity of his polity in
the very social demographic that his counterparts despised. In contrast to the legal phi-
losophers who concentrated their efforts in justifying the existing social order, and in pro-
jecting that order back onto antiquity, and the philologists, who, while interested in his-
torical difference, perceived the ruling elites as the rightful guardians of language, Vico
used philology to expose the pretensions of the philosophers. In doing so, he politicized
both disciplines irrevocably.
PLEBIAN PHILOLOGY ’S POL IT ICS
The relation between philology and philosophy in Vico’s method has been the subject
of this investigation so far. It has been shown that the philological imagination pos-
sessed for Vico a unique capacity to mediate between human and divine knowledge.
Whereas reason secularizes, philology reverses the secularization process; it builds on
the axiom verum esse ipsum factum, truth neither wholly rational nor blind to the lim-
itations of authority. Because its point of departure is that we can only know that which
we create, Vico’s epistemology is inherently contingent and well suited to both generate
and question authority. In its creativity, philological knowledge contests the Cartesian
reduction that, in Vico’s view, deprives human beings of the freedom to create their
pasts, as well as their futures.29. For the sequence bestioni ⇒ heroes ⇒ human I follow Anthony Grafton, Bring Out Your Dead:
The Past as Revelation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 266.
30. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed. Edwin
Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 241.
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not hold that all peoples were poetic or philological in equal degrees. Rather, he argued
that those with greatest access to vernacular forms of expression were the most adept
at expressing themselves poetically, and hence the rightful inheritors of plebian philol-
ogy. For Vico, early Rome exempliﬁed this paradigm through the bestioni, wild beasts
who “imagined the heavens as a great living body” (SN §377). While bestioni primarily
signiﬁes a class of animals, Vico used the term with reference to the prototypes of the
Roman plebeians. Vico identiﬁed three aspects of the bestioni’s philology according:
ﬁrst, a generalized poetic impulse, which, during the earliest period in human history,
was not conﬁned to a single class of individuals but was held in common by everyone;
second, common sense (sensus communis), which equalizes humans and which effects
historical change; third, vernacular knowledge, the linguistic storehouse of humanity’s
poetic wisdom. Only much later did vernacular knowledge become esoteric wisdom
accessible only to the philosophers. The third aspect of the bestioni’s philology is ev-
ident as early as Vico’s ﬁrst treatise on the metaphysics of linguistic knowledge, De
antiquissima.
Vico’s rendering of the form and content of the bestioni’s philology is clear; more
opaque is how to make this prehistorical demographic, the bestioni, legible in historical
terms. While this is a contested area of scholarship, my view is that Vico’s political phi-
lology links the prehistorical bestioni to the plebs of Roman antiquity. While I this ar-
gument has been made before in general terms, scholars who have intimated this link
have not fully teased out its implications for democratic political theory or linked the
politics that emergences from Vico’s philology to his aesthetic agenda.31 To adequately
grasp the link between democratic politics and plebian philology, it is necessary to look
beyond Vico’s immediate object of inquiry—the knowledge of classical antiquity in
general and speciﬁcally the historical development of Roman law—and to take ac-
count of his system as a whole. Looking forward in history (and somewhat, though
not entirely, anachronistically), the bestioni can further be linked to the masses of in-
dustrial modernity, whom Marx sought to liberate in his Vichian critiques of the po-
litical economy.32 Such congruencies are implied in Vico’s claim that “the plebeians
[plebei] were considered to be of bestial origin [origine bestiale], and hence people with
no gods . . . so that they were granted only the beneﬁts of natural liberty” (SN §414).31. Girard, Mali, Marshall, Momigliano, Naddeo, and Grafton have all made signiﬁcant contribu-
tions in this regard; my point is that they have all tended to emphasize either Vico’s politics (or, relat-
edly, his relationship to history) at the expense of his or his aesthetics at the expense of his politics and
that the concept of plebian philology enables us to overcome this polarity.
32. Marx directly references Vico in Das Kapital, in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Werke, 44 vols.
(Berlin: Dietz, 1956–2018), 23:393.
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sacred. Rather the plebeians’ sacred is terrestrial; it is creaturely in the profound sense of
being mortal. The plebeians’ nontranscendent object of worship is a non-Augustinian
Varronian civil theology. In terms of Vichian political philology, it would seem that the
very qualities the plebs lack when compared to the aristocracy are the grounds of their
autonomy, their wisdom, and their political agency.
That the plebs are considered to descend from the bestioni—that they are, in the
most literal and nonderogatory sense, barbarians—empowers them to change the
dominant political structure from aristocracy to democracy once they understand
the true meaning of Virgil’s dictum “Jupiter is the same for everyone” (Iupiter omni-
bus aequus; SN §415). Activating his impressive capacity for politically inﬂected phil-
ological exegesis, Vico notes that later scholars came to read Virgil’s appeal to human
equality in evolutionary terms, and concluded that “all minds are initially equal, but
differences in their physical constitution and civil education make them different”
(§415). In Vico’s reading, this interpretation of Virgil’s dictum is constrained by class
privilege and fails to grasp the meaning of the words in their original context. The elit-
ist interpretation of “Iupiter omnibus aequus” that was normative in Vico’s day rep-
resented a failure of the philological and political imagination to engage with each
other, as well as with the world.33 To read the dictum “Jupiter is the same for everyone”
within the horizon of its original social, political, metaphysical, and epistemic contexts
means adopting the hermeneutic of plebian philology and rejecting the falsiﬁcations
inculcated by the eroi (literally, “heroes,” a category that Vico also radically, and pe-
joratively, resigniﬁes) and subsequently canonized by the aristocracy.
The plebeians’ civil theology is appropriately guided by a “sage of vulgar wisdom
[sapiente di sapienza volgare]” who expressed himself in poetic archetypes long before
the more rational but less poetic philosophies of Plato and Aristotle entered the world.
For the plebs of the Hellenic world, this sage was the same Solon who “urged the ple-
beians to reﬂect on themselves and to conclude that they were equal to the nobles in
their human nature [d’ugual natura umana co’ nobili], and consequently should be
equal in civil rights [civil diritto]” (SN §414). Indeed, the plebs’ lack of divine origins
(linked to their descent from the bestioni) legitimates their claims to political represen-
tation, which for Vico is grounded in the human subject. Vico’s interest in the vernac-33. As Vico indicates, the phrase Iupiter omnibus aequus is foundational for his political philology.
Paraphrasing Tasso, Vico states that the teaching that “Jupiter was equal to all” is the “civil history
[storia civile]” of the Virgilian expression (§415). See Fausto Nicolini, Commento storico alla seconda
Scienza nuova (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1950), 2:162.
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the claim that every populist government is ruled by a sage who represents the collec-
tive wisdom of the masses and who contests the knowledges propagated by the non-
vernacular elite—applies to ancient Rome and Egypt as well as to ancient Greece
(§§415–16). For example, Vico presents Hermes Trismegistus as the Egyptian counter-
part to Solon (§416).34
While recognizing Vico’s suggestive parallel between the bestioni and the plebs, Jo-
sephMali carries this analogy a step further. Mali notes that Vico’s bestioni correspond
to a demographic that was historically more proximate to Vico than were the plebs of
antiquity. The bestioni and, through their mediation, the plebs can be mapped onto the
class divisions of eighteenth-century Naples. Mali suggests that Vico’s “depiction of
the Roman eroi and bestioni was modeled, implicitly at least, on their Neapolitan
counterparts, the nobili and the lazzaroni.”35 Indeed, in an early lecture on rhetoric
Vico himself licensed such analogies when he enjoined the would-be jurist to “draw
a parallel between the Roman Empire and the monarchic system of our age, in order
to investigate whether the same beneﬁcial effects spring from both of them.”36 By link-
ing the bestioni of prehistory to the plebes of antiquity and to the lazzaroni of his era,
Vico was able to ground his philology in a distinctly democratic political philosophy.
Vico’s plebian philology emerges most strikingly in his discussions of the origins of
the Twelve Tables (ca. ﬁfth century BCE), the earliest (and only partly extant) written
articulation of Roman jurisprudence.37 Vico’s achievements in this area have been
studied extensively.38 While his inﬂuence seems marginal to legal philosophy in the
present, Vico’s long-term impact on the development of European law, not least his
discovery of the origins of written Roman law in the customs of the Roman plebs is
reﬂected in a range of sources, from Savigny onward.39 One line of inquiry that has34. For a perspective on Hermes Trismegistus grounded in Arabic sources, see Kevin Bladel, The
Arabic Hermes: From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). This
work compliments Vico’s pioneering provincialization of Europe.
35. Mali, Rehabilitation of Myth, 237.
36. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709) in J. B. Vici Opera Latini, ed. Joseph Ferrari (Milan:
Società tipograﬁca de’ classici italiani, 1835), 2:33.
37. For a critical edition of this text, see Duodecim tabulae, ed. Eric Herbert Warmington (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
38. For a classic account, see Fisch, “Vico on Roman Law,” 62–88.
39. Friedrich von Savigny, the greatest German jurist of the nineteenth century, recognized Vico as
his predecessor in historical jurisprudence and followed his example in pursing the reconstruction of
ancient Roman law through vernacular philology. Savigny was responsible for the German translation
of Vico’s De uno universi iuris (the text that included De constantia philologiae) by K. H. Müller (Fisch
and Bergin, “Introduction,” in AGV, 70). For a later application of Vichian philosophy to comparative
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264 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FA L L 20 1 8not been fully pursued in the context of Vichian plebian philology is the relation be-
tween legal change and democratic legitimacy. Vico stands out among his contempo-
raries for his recognition of the political salience of poetic knowledge (as against Car-
tesian dualism), for his insight into the radical potential of antiquarianism (as against
Bacon and other forward-looking theorists of scientiﬁc knowledge), and for his plebian
political orientation (as against the early modern focus on the rights of kings and, sub-
sequently, of nations). As a result of these innovations, Vico’s reception history can be
narrated largely in terms of the varying responses to his “reinvention of rhetoric.”40
Beyond these achievements, and in the tradition of Dante’s De vulgari eloquentia
(ca. 1302), Vico was the ﬁrst European exegete of an explicitly vernacular philology
that addressed itself to a history that was explicitly not the history of Europe and
the metropole.41 As a result of his vernacular orientation, which views world history
from below, Vico’s range is genuinely global, even when he focuses heavily on Greco-
Roman antiquity. Vico’s main historical actors are the Romans, but whereas before
and even long after Vico, scholars of antiquity focused on the educated elite as the sole
engine driving historical change, Vico examines the origins of popular sovereignty
through the ﬁgure of the bestioni. Whereas previous authors focused on the eroi (the
nobility) as the bearers of the only conceivable history worth narrating, Vico concen-
trates on both the eroi and the bestioni, a label he uses interchangeably with the plebs
(i plebei). In fact, Vico only takes an interest in the eroi to the extent that this elite de-
mographic sheds light on the vernacular imagination.
ROMAN LAW AND THE PLEBS
Among the contemporary impediments to understanding Vico is his immense erudi-
tion. The sources of Vico’s knowledge derive largely from archives that have come to
be seen as irrelevant to modern intellectual inquiry. It is difﬁcult to recover the sense of
urgency that attends Vico’s polemic against standard accounts of the genesis of Roman
law in Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Pomponius, Pliny the Elder, Cicero, and pseudo-
Heraclitus. Yet, it has been claimed even in recent decades that Vico’s reading of Roman40. David Marshall, “The Current State of Vico Scholarship,” Journal of the History of Ideas 72,
no. 1 (2011): 141. For meticulous documentation of Vico’s relation to the rhetorical traditions of
his past and present, see Michael Mooney, Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 3–23.
41. The contribution of Vico’s political theory to anticolonial thought is excavated in Timothy
Brennan, Borrowed Light: Vico, Hegel and the Colonies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
jurisprudence, see M. Chassan’s remarkable and unjustly neglected Essai de la Symbolique du Droit:
Sur la poésie du droit primitive (Paris: Videcoq ﬁls aîné, 1847). As the title suggests, this work is as
indebted to Creuzer’s Symbolik (1801) as it is to Vico.
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ing what Vico intended—politically, philosophically, and poetically—by his revolu-
tionary genealogy of the Twelve Tables.
Before Vico, a long and revered historical tradition traced the genesis of Roman law
to the Greeks.43 Cicero, Dionysus Halicarnassus, and Livy all concurred in the basic
details. In the year 245 CE (according to the Roman calendar), the monarchy was over-
thrown. In the ensuing chaos, the plebeians pushed for increased transparency in the
law. They demanded a written document that would clearly specify what was permit-
ted and what was forbidden and that would outline the punishment for infractions.
The laws by which these plebeians lived—and according to which they could be exe-
cuted or imprisoned—had until then been shrouded in mystery, doubtlessly in order
to consolidate the ruling class’s power. After nearly ﬁfty years of internecine struggle,
the patricians ﬁnally yielded and agreed to provide a written law to which they as well
as the plebs would be subject.
A problem remained. On what basis could such a law be formulated, given that
there was no precedent for written law in Roman history? According to Dionysus
Halicarnassus and Livy, the patrician assembly dispatched a deputation to Athens, a
city that famed for the integrity of its laws due to Solon’s democratic code.44 Three
years later, the deputation returned. Ten men (the Decemvirs) were appointed to pro-
duce a synthesis of Greek laws and Roman customs. These ten laws were then erected
in the Forum, in the center of Rome, for all to see, and to remind those who were lit-
erate of their accountability to a general jurisprudential code that was not speciﬁc to
their rank or class. Two more tables were added in the following year, hence the name
by which the Twelve Tables (Duodecim Tabulae) came to be known.
As with Varro’s Antiquitates, Vico’s other major source for the reconstruction of
antiquity, the Twelve Tables have reached us only in fragments. There has been much
debate in modern scholarship concerning their original content as well as the historical
process through which these laws were codiﬁed. Vico’s name hardly takes center stage
in these debates, which have focused more on the interpretation of speciﬁc empirical42. Fisch, “Vico on Roman Law,” 88.
43. This summary is informed by Patrick H. Hutton, “The Problem of Oral Tradition in Vico’s
Historical Scholarship,” Journal of the History of Ideas 53, no. 1 (1992): 10–23. There is of course a rich
literature on this topic in classical studies, among which the most relevant are Andrew Lintott, The
Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Callie Williamson,
The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
44. For a historical discussion of Solon’s code, see Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democ-
racy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology (Oklahoma City: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1999), 27–54
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concur in asserting that Vico was the ﬁrst to suggest that the story that has reached
us from Dionysus Halicarnassus and Livy was based on a lie, which he referred to
as “the conceit of scholars” (SN §§124, 127, 284, 330). Only by recognizing the political
stakes of Vico’s philological argument concerning the genesis of Roman law can we
accurately trace the conﬂuence of forces that converge in his plebian philology.
Vico’s rejection of the Greek origin theory has been described as an a priori dismissal
required by his philosophical agenda, and as therefore inadequate from a scholarly
point of view.45 It is true that Vico made many mistakes in his account. He confused
Dionysus of Halicarnassus with Longinus, did not adequately check his references,
and frequently misquoted his sources. Viewed rigidly, Vico’s account seems simulta-
neously brilliant and technically ﬂawed. The questions raised by Vico with respect to
the origin and codiﬁcation of the Twelve Tables had to wait, so runs this argument, until
the more rigorous research of Barthold Georg Niebuhr and Pierre-Nicholas Bonamy in
subsequent centuries to bear their richest fruit.
Such critiques offer an important context for assessing the scholarly limitations of
Vico’s plebian philology. And yet the distinctiveness of plebian philology (embodied
in the dictum “verum esse ipsum factum”) lies in its contestation of the division between
a priori and a posteriori knowledge. There is one truth, Vico teaches, that humans
can know, one truth alone. That one truth consists of everything humans have made.
This epistemological principle applies even to God, with the necessary qualiﬁcation
that God is unbegotten and therefore knows, in a way humans can never know, the
nature of the universe. The verum-factum principle trumps the quest for certain knowl-
edge outside an a priori structure. There may or may not be a “pre” to verum-factum,
but neither our knowledge, nor even God’s knowledge, can transcend the verum-
factum divide.46
The Vichian a priori is language, the wisdom of the ancient Italians (as in De
antiquissima), which in the New Science morphs into a full-scale politics of plebian
philology. Vico’s rejection of the Greek origin thesis for the Twelve Tablets converges
well with his philosophy of history, speciﬁcally with his conviction that all nations45. See Michael Steinberg, “The Twelve Tables and Their Origins: An Eighteenth-Century Debate,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 43, no. 3 (1982): 384–96.
46. These remarks are informed by Sheldon Pollock’s distinction between ultimate truth (para-
marthika sat) and pragmatic truth (vyavaharika sat) in Indian philosophy, which he explicitly links
to Vico’s verum/certum distinction in “Future Philology? The Fate of a Soft Science in a Hard World,”
Critical Inquiry 35, no. 4 (2009): 950.
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V I CO ’ S P L E B I A N PH I LO LOGY | 267(except the Hebrews) develop through parallel trajectories and that the Romans could
not have borrowed their law from the Greeks because the Romans already had their
own law, buried palimpsest-like in the customs of the bestioni. But such a reading,
which is already accepted by scholars, obscures the fact that Vico rejects historical de-
terminism. Nor does he apply principles in the abstract. For Vico, abstraction is the
enemy of knowledge; Marshall aptly describe it as “an emaciation of language that robs
[language] of its metaphorical capacity to denote particular phenomena with words
that denote things sharing particular likenesses with those phenomena.”47 Marshall
also offers the salient observation that “The Scienza nuova’s almost complete absten-
tion from an abstract analytical vocabulary derives from this attitude toward language
and requires readers to place themselves in the position of poets as they reconstitute
the text for themselves.”48 The concept of political agency entailed in plebian philology
extends beyond the text itself.
From the point of view of Vichian epistemology, the a priori has no conceptual
value. There is no “before” and “after” to the attainment of certainty. Vico would of
course insist that this insight describes knowledge generally. Neither verum nor certum
can escape being shaped by the contingent conditions under which our knowledge is
generated ( factum ipse esse verum). The epistemological claim that we know what we
make generates the ontological insight that, over the course of such knowledge, which
always takes place through language, we become what we already are. In the process of
becoming, we create our knowledge. In other words, we create ourselves. Herein lies
the meaning and substance of freedom from the point of view of plebian philology.
All forms of Vichian knowing are functions of the factum ipse esse verum principle.
To the extent that knowledge is necessarily hierarchical and that different methodol-
ogies generate different results, the polarity between truth and falsity, and facticity ver-
sus the imagination, invalidates itself. Vico’s concept of political agency relies on an
active imagination that is an agent of creation in that which it sees. Democracy for
Vico is at once epistemic and political. Built on the poetic perception of plebeians,
it requires their continuing participation in the political activity commonwealth, in-
cluding especially in the drafting and interpretation of the laws to which everyone
is subject. Understood in these terms, plebian philology is equally a political and an
epistemic project. It is political because it cannot be realized without plebian agency,
and it is epistemic because this agency is necessarily expressed in a speciﬁc, poetic, ver-
nacular form.47. Marshall, Vico and the Transformation of Rhetoric, 196.
48. Ibid.
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TO POLIT ICAL ACTION
Vico’s plebian philology reveals itself most strikingly in the numerous allusions to So-
lon that permeate theNew Science. Two crucial passages will sufﬁce here. Vico states in
book 2 (“On Poetic Wisdom”) that Solon was a sage of popular wisdom who led the
Greeks from aristocracy to democracy. We know from Diogenes Laertius that Solon
corresponded with the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos, also known to history as the ﬁrst
editor of the Homeric epics, on the subject of tyranny, freedom, and democracy.49 Ac-
cording to Diogenes Laertius, whom Vico elsewhere cites as his source for his knowl-
edge of Roman law, Solon possessed astonishing insight, rare among statesmen past
and present, into the sources of oppression and inequality, and the means for over-
coming injustice. When Solon was asked how men could be deterred from committing
injustice, he replied that the best deterrent was a society, and a social conscience, that
ensured that “those who are not injured feel as much indignation as those who are.”50
On Vico’s reconstruction, Solon understood that justice could never be the prop-
erty of a single polity and least of all a single individual. Only when those who are
not oppressed are outraged by the oppression of others could democratic politics be
achieved. Such was Vico’s reading of Solon; it was at once radically historical, inas-
much as it drew its inspiration from the past, and radically anachronistic, inasmuch
as it mined the past for material relevant to the political present. Vico’s account of
the transition from plebeian popular wisdom to democratic philosophy suggests that
the fullest concept of democracy before modernity was theorized—in vernacular lan-
guage and in poetic terms—not by Plato and Aristotle but rather by the plebs and So-
lon, their populist spokesman. Solon—and here Vico is emphatic—was not a philos-
opher. He was a sage, an exponent of popular wisdom (sapienza volgare; SN §414),
held in common by all from the ﬁrst age of humanity. Vico’s discussion of Solon is
arguably the most important and certainly the most democratically informed elabora-
tion of “common sense” before Gramsci.51 Witness Vico’s application of Solon’s exam-
ple to Roman history:49. Peisistratos’s reputation as the ﬁrst editor of Homer is probably apocryphal. Rudolf Pfeiffer ar-
gues that the text was not fully redacted until the Alexandrian grammarians; see History of Classical
Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 6–15,
25.
50. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, trans. C. D. Yonge (Lon-
don: Henry Bohn, 1853), 28.
51. Vico’s inﬂuence on Gramsci is further discussed in Ernesto Grassi, Humanismus und Mar-
xismus: Zur Kritik der Verselbständigung von Wissenschaft (Leipzig: Rowohlt, 1973), 65ff.
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relates how, in their heroic contentions with the nobility, the plebeians at Rome
protested that the fathers chosen for the Senate by Romulus “had not descended
from heaven” . . . the founders of the patriciate did not have the divine origin of
which the patricians boasted. Instead, Jupiter was equal for all. This is the civil
and historical sense of the Virgilian tag Iupiter omnibus aequus, Jupiter is equal
for all. . . . Reﬂecting on this, plebeians began to seek equality with the patricians
in civil liberty [adeguare co’ patrizi la civil libertà], and eventually changed the
Roman republic from an aristocracy to a democracy [la romana repubblica da
aristocratica in popolare]. (§415)
Here Vico illustrates plebian philology in practice, both with respect to its method
of interpretation as well as its substantive claims. His hermeneutics is focused on et-
ymologies and popular sayings rather than on texts because texts are addressed ex-
clusively to the elite. Vico argues that the aristocracy, including the class of the phi-
losophers entrusted with interpreting esoteric knowledge, merely rewrote what the
plebeians knew all along. In the same sense that philosophy derives from and depends
on the authority of language (which is democratically guaranteed by the plebeians), so
does philology subjugate itself to reason, in the form of common sense. Any attempt to
derive philosophy from a source other than the poetry that is the collective creation of
a common plebeian humanity, as Descartes and Augustine sought to do, is doomed to
obsolescence. From this perspective, theology based on revelation is the philosophical
equivalent of Cartesian rationalism (and vice versa). For Vico, democratic constitu-
tions are established not through the esoteric knowledge of an elite class of philoso-
phers or theologians, nor through hypothetical cogitos that Charles Peirce—another,
later, democratic thinker with as-yet-unstudied Vichian leanings—dismissed as “paper
doubt” in a polemic against Descartes, but through the poetic knowledge and the phil-
ological insight of the plebs.52
Vico argues plebeians practiced both philology and democracy more effectively
than the philosophers. He words that follow from the quotation cited above are even
more breathtaking in their universalism that is the text that precedes it. “We shall
prove,” Vico announces, “both through reasons [ragioni] and through authority [au-
torità] that the plebeians of [all] peoples [plebi de’ popoli] took Solon’s reﬂection liter-
ally, and so changed the commonwealths from aristocracies to democracies [cangia-
rono le repubbliche da aristocratiche in popolari]” (SN §415). The phraseology here52. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks, 8 vols.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–58), 5:514.
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that, in this second iteration, the plebeians are now acting in a universal capacity
(universalmente), rather than as mere representatives of a speciﬁc social class in an-
cient Rome. They are plebeians of peoples generally, not of one speciﬁc polity. These
universal subjects are the agents through which world history, in Vico’s account, is
transformed, and plebian philology is rendered as a knowledge form. Like the Roman
plebeians, they seek “equality,” or, in a more literal rendering of Vico’s words, they
adapt and adjust the civil liberties enjoyed by the patricians to their own needs and
demands. While it is possible to question where Vico envision here that the plebeians
that the plebeians are demands full equality of rights in the contemporary sense his
language unambiguous shows that the plebeians are seeking to adjust the rights
according to them according to their sense of justice and that this sense of justice is
informed by the rights that are already accorded to the patricians. The link Vico
draws—in both the case of the Roman plebeians and plebeians generally—between
the demand for civil liberties that approximate those enjoyed by the patricians and
the transformation of the republic from an aristocracy to a form of popular governance
(that I have translated as “democracy”) makes this point unambiguously clear.
On Vico’s account, the plebeians changed the internal constitution of their polities
by internalizing the phrase inscribed in Athens’s public spaces: “Know thyself.” The
saying had long been associated with Solon, but Vico was the ﬁrst modern theorist
to deduce from Solon’s precept a political grounding for vernacular democracy. So-
lon’s “Know thyself” is understood by Vico as an injunction to plebian philology. Re-
sponding to this injunction means engaging in interpretation, exegesis, and analysis, as
well as in the generation of poetic knowledge. On Vico’s account, such activities nec-
essarily conduce to a republic’s transformation from an aristocracy to a democracy.
By demanding to be governed according to a text that was legible to them, the ple-
beians instituted the transition from aristocracy to democracy. Rather than locating
democracy more conventionally in the political theories of Plato and Aristotle, Vico
locates the origins of democratic politics in a legal system that preceded them both.
Only after Greek thought fell into the possession of the elites, according to Vico,
did Solon’s “Know thyself” lose its political edge. The self that was the object of knowl-
edge in Solon’s dictum was elevated to a metaphysical category. Originally, “Know thy-
self” was a political injunction, and it was understood as such by the plebeians of an-
cient Greece.
Vico later repeats his interpretation, adding that even before Solon, Aesop had ex-
pressed similar counsels in the form of extended similes (SN §424). Elsewhere, Vico
claims that “metaphor comprises most of the language among all nations” (§444).
The linking of ﬁgures of speech that are premised on an aesthetic of comparison, suchThis content downloaded from 142.150.248.112 on October 09, 2018 23:20:39 PM
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mutually constitutive relations between philological-poetic perception and political
agency; simile involves the recognition of likeness, and metaphor borrows attribute
from one object and attaches them to another.53 InDe antiquissima, Vico had called this
capacity ingenium, “the faculty that connects disparate or diverse things” (DA, 118),
and related it to geometrical reasoning.54 Ingenuity was also not coincidentally a trait
Vico ascribed to himself in his autobiography.55 In the New Science, ingenium becomes
a precondition for democracy.
That Vico’s rendering of poetic perception, as of the relation between philology and
philosophy, is simultaneously an epistemology, an aesthetics, and a political theory of
democracy is apparent from his account of the development of human knowledge, be-
ginning with induction, then moving to dialectic, and concluding in syllogism. He
writes that proofs originally relied on “example, which requires only one similarity;
and eventually by induction, which requires several [similarities]. The father of all
the philosophical sects, Socrates, used induction to establish dialectic. Later, Aristotle
perfected it in the syllogism, which requires universals for its validity” (SN §424). Later,
reinforcing this genealogy, Vico insists that “the history of human ideas is strikingly
conﬁrmed by the history of philosophy itself” (§499). This genealogy mirrors the con-
densed account of the development of knowledge offered earlier in the New Science:
“Men at ﬁrst feel without observing, then they observe with a troubled and agitated
spirit, ﬁnally they reﬂect with a clear mind” (§218). Far from opposing these radically
different forms of reasoning, Vico situates them within a continuum that is classiﬁed
according to the locus of political agency and that includes poetic knowledge.
Conceptual universals had little purchase on reality until power passed from the
bestioni to the ruling class, but the empirical, conceptual, and structural interdepen-
dency of philological and philosophical knowledge centrally motivates Vico’s episte-
mology. The movement from popular wisdom to esoteric philosophy, including meta-
physics, logic, and ethics, is rehearsed once again through Solon’s example at the end53. This distinction is further explicated in the context of Islamic literary theory in Rebecca Gould,
“The Persian Translation of Arabic Aesthetics: Rādūyānī’s Rhetorical Renaissance,” Rhetorica: A Jour-
nal of the History of Rhetoric 33, no. 4 (2016): 339–71. An inﬂuential Vichian account of the relation
among different ﬁgures of speech in time is Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957).
54. For further discussion of the uses of ingenium in Vico’s oeuvre, see Mooney, Vico in the Tra-
dition of Rhetoric, 135–69.
55. Opere di Giambattista Vico, ed. Francesco Saverio Pomodoro, 1:1 (5 AGV, 111). In this pas-
sage, Vico says that from his earliest childhood he belonged to those who possess “ingenuity and depth
[uomini ingegnosi e profondi]” and who therefore “are as quick as lightening in perception” and “take
no pleasure in shallow witticisms or falsehoods.”
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272 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FA L L 2 0 1 8of the ﬁnal book of the New Science, where it is discussed as part of the conceptual de-
pendency of elite knowledge (philosophy, jurisprudence) on the vernacular common
sense of the plebs. This leads Vico to a sweeping conclusion that encapsulates his cen-
tral argument. “Wemay therefore conclude,”Vico declares, “that all principles of meta-
physics, logic, and ethics originated in the Athens marketplace” (SN §457; cf. §1043).
Vico’s postulate explains how Solon, originally an embodiment of vernacular wisdom,
became a guardian of esoteric knowledge that was subsequently known only to the elite.
Through this process, which Vico sees repeated throughout world history, the rela-
tion entailed in Seneca’s famous lament, later made even more famous by Nietzsche,
whereby “that which was philosophy has become philology” (Epistula 108, 23) was re-
peated.56 Far from lamenting the reduction of philosophy to philology, Vico theorizes
the conditions of possibility for this disciplinary transmutation, which he regards as
foundational to democracy. He looked to Solon’s democratic legal system as a source
for a new critical, and for the ﬁrst time, wholly vernacular, philology. Vico grounded
his political philology not in the Greece of Plato and Aristotle, but in the “popular wis-
dom” of the plebs, which he consistently distinguished from philosophical, esoteric
knowledge.
VERNACULARITY AND DEMOCRACY
More than any philosopher of his age although like many who followed in his path,
Vico perceived the struggle between the bestioni and the eroi as the major political
force in history.57 Also in contradistinction to his contemporaries, Vico recognized
that the history of plebian oppression could be traced to the very origins of humanity.
Equally, he perceived that plebians’ resistance to being ruled according to conditions
not of their own choosing begins in antiquity—and indeed prior to antiquity with the
bestioni. In stark contrast to Hobbes, Vico believes that no people would willingly ac-
cept servitude, and no one would knowingly consent to their subjugation. In this sense,
Vico’s genealogy of human knowledge, and of the ever-shifting relation between phi-
losophy and philology is also a history of human freedom. Vico was a backward-
looking philosopher who developed a radical template for the future of humanity.
In contradistinction to his epigones, Vico saw that the metaphysical order legiti-
mating class oppression was grounded in power dynamics that had evolved over time.56. Cited in James I. Porter, Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 35.
57. For a classic analysis of this antinomy as it plays out over the course of Vico’s oeuvre, see
Arnaldo Momigliano, “Vico’s Scienza nuova: Roman ‘Bestioni’ and Roman ‘Eroi,’ ” History and Theory
5, no. 1 (1966): 3–23.
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originally referred not to any member of the human species but solely to the nobility.
Slaves by contrast were referred to as ver, from whence derives the term vernacular
(§§556–57). In light of this etymology, it should come as no surprise that vernacular
(along with the demographic it represented) is a term of opprobrium in most of the
world’s major classical languages, including Sanskrit, Arabic, Greek, and Latin, given
that these languages have been cultivated largely by the ruling elite.58 Vico dwells at
length on the consequences of vernacularization for world history, for the struggle
among different social demographics, and for democratic legitimacy.
The New Science could only have been written in the vernacular. Had it been writ-
ten in Latin like Vico’s other philosophical treatises, it would have violated the very
principles it preached.59 Auerbach found Vico brilliant and provoking but lacking ac-
cording to his historicist paradigm.60 Meanwhile, Benedetto Croce homogenized Vico
as a precursor to liberal political theory. In his book-length study of Vico, Croce pre-
sented Vico’s New Science as one stage in his grand “history of liberty.” Croce missed
how Vichian politics both anticipates and supersedes the historical determinism that
underwrites Croce’s brand of liberal political thought. Rather than recapitulate a series
of law without human agency, Vico’s plebian philology generates democracy. Even
while allowing for the cyclical recurrence (ricorsi) of the past, the Vichian vision of
historical change is drastically unlike Croce’s Hegelian dialectic. My reading of Vico
suggests that one reason why literary critics and political theorists alike have failed
to appreciate Vico’s originality is that his understanding of the central role of plebian
philology in making world history breaches political and aesthetic norms.58. The classic comparative study of literary vernacularization, focusing primarily on the Sanskrit
and Latin interface with Indic and European vernaculars, is Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods
in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2006). Also see Walter Cohen, “The Rise of the Written Vernacular: Europe and Eurasia,”
PMLA 126, no. 3 (2011): 719–29. Vernacularity in the Arab-Islamic context is discussed in Ronit Ricci,
Islam Translated: Literature, Conversion, and the Arabic Cosmopolis of South and Southeast Asia (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
59. Vico preferred reading in Latin to reading in Italian, and even in the various editions of theNew
Science, his Italian is notable its archaic spellings and the profusion of Latinisms. Another interesting
stylistic distinction between Vico’s Latin and Italian suggestive of class difference is that his Universal
Law, written in Latin, is amply footnoted and sources are given for all citations, whereas none of the
Italian editions of the New Science have footnotes.
60. James Porter discusses Auerbach’s writings on Vico in detail but without commenting on the
limitations in Auerbach’s interpretation in his introduction to Time, History, and Literature: Selected
Essays of Erich Auerbach, ed. James I. Porter and trans. Jane O. Newman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2016), xxxi–xxxiv.
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erty than of liberation. A political subject be nominally free without being liberated,
just as the subject can be liberated without being free. The civil liberties that Vico’s
plebeians demanded for themselves (SN §§106, 415, 420) is not reducible to a concept
of universal freedom, which remained an abstraction. Nor is it precisely a human right,
although Vico was one of the ﬁrst to theorise democratic legitimacy in a way that priv-
ileged neither the ruling class, nor any speciﬁc nation, religion, gender, or race. Vico per-
ceived that historical change was generated by the corsi and recorsi of history. While he
expected that the plebeians would, at various junctures in history, prevail over the ruling
class, he knew that these victories were fragile and contingent—and as fungible and
subject to manipulation as language itself.
Theorists who have built on Vico’s ediﬁce have arguably gone too far in assimilating
his thought to our modernity, when in fact Vico matters to us know precisely in pro-
portion to his distance from us. Having been labeled a proto-Marxist, proto-historicist,
and proto-typologist of literary form, Vico is in fact none of these—and also much
more. Vico’s departures from the disciplinary norms of philology and philosophy con-
found attempts to ground disciplinary knowledge within ﬁxed and unchanging hierar-
chies. In the context of early modern thought, Vico’s repositioning of philological in-
quiry as a foundation for philosophical knowledge marked a relatively new horizon
in the history of the humanities.61 It also demarcated a new frontier in the history of
politics and in future political possibility.
For Vico, plebian philology is as much an epistemic locution and a political claim as
a disciplinary method. His merger of philosophy and philology is an injunction to the
reformulation of democratic legitimacy along plebian lines. In making the plebian
imagination constitutive of political authority as such, and in subordinating philosoph-
ical reason to this authority, Vico stimulated a form of critique (critica) that was to
change human history. It was in this sense—and not in the senses discussed above—
that he may be regarded as Marx’s predecessor. In the introduction to his New Science,
Vico announced his originality. “My work,” he declared, “employs a new form of crit-
icism [nuova arte critica] that was previously lacking” (SN §7). If we know what we61. It was of course not without precedent, as evidenced by Joseph Justus Scaliger, who set forth his
own vision for critical philology in 1574; see Benedetto Bravo, “Critice in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries and the Rise of the Notion of Historical Criticism,” in History of Scholarship: A Selec-
tion of Papers from the Seminar on the History of Scholarship Held Annually at theWarburg Institute, ed.
C. R. Ligota and J.-L. Quantin (London: Warburg Institute, 2006), 135–96. For further on the subject of
Vico’s reconceptualization of philology within the context of philosophy, see Donald R. Kelly, “Vico’s
Road: From Philology to Jurisprudence and Back,” Giambattista Vico’s Science of Humanity, ed.
Giorgio Tagliacozzo and D. P. Verene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 15–29.
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politics. As a discipline that has distinguished itself from philosophy ever since Marx’s
call to change the world rather than simply to understand it, critical theory is plebian
philology’s progeny.62 The reﬂection onVico’s plebian philology offered here has aimed
to ground the Marxian concept of critique, so central to our understanding of the po-
litical dimensions of our everyday lives, in the vernacular knowledge form that Vico
helped us to see, as if for the ﬁrst time.
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